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Abstract 
We introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments. In the 
game, the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart’s 
decision, but potentially at a cost for the counterpart. We identify at the individual level 
the decision to lie, and measure how individuals react to different incentives to lie. 
Furthermore we investigate how lying behavior changes over time. Our method allows us 
to classify people into types, including those who never lie, those who always lie, and 
those who react to incentives to lie. We suggest this method as a useful instrument for 
examining factors that influence the decision to lie.  
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1. Introduction 
Accumulating evidence suggests people are averse to lying in economic interactions. This 
evidence is in contrast with the classic approach in economics, which assumes people are 
selfish and that lying in itself does not carry any cost (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).  
Evidence in support of the positive costs of lying comes primarily from experiments that 
can measure behavior in controlled settings. The ability to measure lying costs and to compare 
the effect of manipulating the environment on these costs is important to our understanding of 
the factors that influence the decision to lie. Two main experimental procedures were 
developed in the last decade. Each method has its pros and cons. In this paper, we propose a 
third approach, which eliminates some of the problems with the existing methods. 
The first method uses a two-player deception game in which a sender has private 
information and the receiver takes an action (Gneezy, 2005). The sender sends a message to 
the receiver, and payoffs to both players depend on the action chosen, not on the message. 
Gneezy (2005) showed incentives impact the decision to lie: when the sender earns more 
money from lying, she is more likely to lie. Moreover, increasing the receiver’s loss from a lie 
reduces the probability that a sender will lie. Studies have adopted the game to show, for 
example, men are more likely to tell a lie that helps them but hurts the other (Dreber and 
Johannesson, 2008), and the cost of lying for some is high enough that they are unwilling to 
lie even when doing so would have helped both players (Erat and Gneezy, 2012).1 A problem 
with this procedure is the decision to lie depends on the sender’s beliefs regarding whether the 
receiver will follow her message. Some senders may choose to tell the truth because they 
expect the receiver not to follow the message (Sutter, 2009).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cappelen, Sorensen and Tungodden (2013) study the non-economic dimensions of the decision to lie, Erat 
(2013) examines the decision to delegate deception, and Angelova and Regner (2013), Danilov et al. (2013) and 
Ismayilov and Potters (2013) use this setup to study lying within the context of financial advice. 
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The second method for measuring lying behavior uses a non-strategic procedure to avoid 
the strategic considerations associated with measuring lies. In this method, a participant takes 
an action for which only she knows the outcome, and then reports it to the experimenter. The 
reported outcome, which the experimenter cannot verify, determines the participant’s payoff. 
This method also allows the participant to lie without the experimenter’s knowledge.  
In Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), participants are asked to roll a six-sided die in private 
and then report the resulting outcome. The participants are paid an amount equal to the 
number they report, unless the number is six, in which case they are paid zero. Although the 
experimenter cannot verify the outcome of the die roll, the distribution of the reported 
numbers can reveal the extent of lying in the population in the way that distribution differs 
from the expected distribution of outcomes from a fair die roll (see also, e.g., Greene and 
Paxton, 2009, Fosgaard, Hansen and Piovesan, 2013, Jiang, 2013, Ploner and Regner, 2013, 
and Shalvi and Leiser, 2013).  
The authors found some participants were honest (reported zero profits) and that 
significantly more than one sixth reported either a four or five. In a similar setup, Mazar, 
Amir, and Ariely (2008) designed an experiment in which participants were asked to answer a 
test with 20 math tasks, and were paid according to the number of correct answers. To 
establish the benchmark, in the first treatment, the experimenter checked participants’ 
answers. In another treatment, the participants checked their tests themselves and then 
shredded them, preventing the experimenter from verifying the reported number of correct 
answers. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) find participants on average reported about 10% 
more questions solved when they could cheat (see also, e.g, Pascual-Ezama, Prelec and 
Dunfield, 2013). 
This method has two notable drawbacks. First, as described above, the inference made 
is not based on results from individual participants but on statistical distributions, because the 
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experimenter does not know whether a given participant lied. A recent paper by Gibson, 
Tanner and Wagner (2013) avoids this drawback by informing participants, in the role of 
CEOs, about the true value of their firm’s earnings and asking them to report the earnings of 
their company to a passive market. Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2013) also avoid this drawback by 
asking participants to throw away their tests in a recycle bin, from which they recovered them 
afterwards. However, the latter papers and the papers mentioned above face a second 
drawback. The “victim” of the lie is not another participant, but rather the experimenter. The 
identity of the victim might affect decision making.   
 In this paper, we propose a new method that attempts to overcome the problems of the 
two methods described. The sender’s payoff does not depend on the receiver’s decision but 
only on her message, and yet has consequences for the receiver. We observe lying on an 
individual basis, which is crucial for obtaining individual-level results. Observing individual 
decisions however comes with a cost. The participants cannot disguise their behavior from the 
experimenter; this may evoke behavior more compliant to social norms.   
 
2. Experimental Design 
2.1. The Decision Task 
Consider a pair of two participants A and B. A randomly determined integer number 1 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 6, the state, is assigned to the pair. Each number is equally likely. Participant A is 
informed about the number assigned, and sends a message about this number to Participant B. 
Her message must be one of the following: “The assigned number is r,” with 𝑟 ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 . Participant B receives this message and decides whether to follow it.  
A’s payoff increases linearly with the number reported in the message and neither 
depends on the state nor on B’s decision. More precisely, her payoff is 
𝜋! = 10+ 2 ∙ 𝑟. 
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B’s payoff depends on whether he follows A’s message, and if he does follow it, whether the 
reported number corresponds to the state: 
𝜋! = 10        if  B  follows  and  𝑟 = 𝑠  0          if  B  follows  and  𝑟 ≠ 𝑠    3                    if  B  does  not  follow. 
 
If A only cares about her own monetary payoff, she will always report 𝑟 = 6, independent 
of s. Reporting 6 yields a payoff of 22, whereas being truthful yields 10+ 2 ∙ 𝑠. Hence the 
lower s is, the higher A’s monetary gain from lying. Note the behavior of participant A is our 
main interest in this paper because it represents the decision to lie. 
The advantage of this game over the existing methods described in the introduction is that 
the payoff of participant A does not depend on the reaction of participant B, and yet it affects 
the payoffs of B and not the experimenter. If A cares about B’s payoff, her decision to lie will 
not only depend on her profit but also on B’s harm from a lie.  Importantly, our method (as 
described below) allows us to get detailed data about an individual’s decision to lie and how 
that decision depends on incentives.   
 
2.2. Experimental Procedures 
We ran the experiment at the Munich Laboratory for the Experimental and Social 
Sciences (MELESSA), at the University of Munich.  Using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), we 
recruited 72 participants, 36 of whom we randomly assigned to the role of A, and 36 to the 
role of B. The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Upon arriving at the lab, participants were asked to draw a number and sit at the 
computer terminal with that number. The experimenter provided a print version of the 
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instructions and read them aloud. The English translation of the instructions can be found in 
the Appendix. 
The experimental task was played for 24 periods, with random re-matching in groups of 
12 subjects (6 As and 6 Bs). We informed participants they would meet the same counterpart 
four times during the experiment but would not know when. We used the strategy method in 
each period: A was asked to decide, for each possible number assigned to the pair, which 
message to send. Hence we get a rich data set regarding A’s decision to lie, as well as how this 
decision changes over the 24 periods. We also asked B to decide whether to follow each 
possible message sent by A. At the end of each period, participants received feedback about 
the assigned number, the message sent by A, B’s decision regarding whether to follow it, and 
the payoff of A and B. 
Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes and participants received their accumulated 
earnings, on average 15.74 Euro (sd=7.1), including a show-up fee of 4 Euro.  
 
3. Results 
In what follows, we first examine the messages sent by As. We then examine Bs’ 
decisions regarding whether to follow the messages. Finally, we provide a classification of As 
into types, depending on the lying decisions. We perform all tests at the matching-group level. 
Because our comparisons will be within treatment, we use two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests throughout, unless otherwise mentioned. 
 
3.1. Messages sent by A 
Figure 1 displays a scatter plot showing what message r (y axis) was sent for a given state 
s (x axis). The size of each circle reflects the relative frequency of each message for a given 
state. This frequency value is shown in the lower part of each circle.  
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The frequency with which A sends the true message depends on s. When the state is 1, As 
reveal it truthfully 36% of the time. As s increases, truthful reporting increases and reaches 
60% when the state is 5. The reverse occurs with respect to reporting 6. The probability of 
reporting 6 decreases as the state increases, as can be seen from the estimated marginal effects 
in Table 1. It drops from 52% to 48% to 44% to 37% to 33%. In all states except 6, the 
likelihood of reporting 6 is significantly lower than in state 6, controlling for the period in the 
experiment and the individual’s age and gender (see Table 1). Non-parametric tests (p-
value=0.028 in all pairwise comparisons between 𝑠 ≠ 6 and 𝑠 = 6) also confirm this result. 
Thus, in low states, in which the gain from lying is higher, lying is more frequent than in high 
states. This finding is in line with Gneezy’s (2005) finding that the decision to lie depends on 
the incentives, but appears contrary to arguments that lying costs increase in the “size of the 
lie,” measured as the distance between the reported and the true state. 
Also note that for states 1 to 3, in at least 10% of cases, the As do not lie “fully.” They 
report a number higher than the true state but do not report a 6. This finding is in line with 
Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), though the frequency with which it occurs in our setting is 
relatively small.  
 
<Insert Figure 1> 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
Lying increases over time for the low states 1 or 2, whereas no significant trend in lying 
occurs for states 3, 4, or 5 (taking 6 as a baseline); see column (2) of Table 1. As shown in 
Figure 2, in period 1, the frequency with which A reports 6 if the state is not 6 is between 28% 
and 33% in all cases. However, lying more than doubles by period 24, when the state is 1 or 2, 
up to 58%, whereas it remains around 40% if the state is 4 or 5 (42% and 39%, respectively). 
This difference in the time-trend of lying across states could be due to As becoming more 
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aware of the gains from lying and choosing to take advantage of them when the payoff from 
telling the truth is low. Alternatively, telling the truth may require some self-control. In 
particular, Mead et al. (2009) and Gino et al. (2011) show that depleted individuals, after 
completing standard tasks such as the Stroop task, are more likely to cheat. If repeatedly 
telling the truth, as in our experiment, is also depleting, this could also explain our results.  
 
<Insert Figure 2> 
If A cares about B’s payoff her lying decision should not only depend on her own profit, but 
should also be influenced by B’s following behavior. From the detailed feedback on Bs’ 
decisions, As learn about the likelihood of Bs’ following. Table 2 examines the dynamics of 
lying, by regressing the likelihood of lying in period t on the use of a lie in t-1 and other 
controls. In particular, we focus on the effect of a lie in t-1 that was followed by B (Lied in t-
1 & B followed). That the likelihood of lying in t decreases significantly if A told a lie that 
hurt B in the previous period suggests that As also care about Bs’ payoffs. Note that also in 
this regression, where we control for B’s past behavior, the probability of lying decreases 
with the state, as shown in Table 1. 
<Insert Table 2> 
 
3.2. Following by B 
If A sends a message lower than 6, Bs follow it in most cases. On average, messages 1 to 
5 are followed in 85%, 88%, 89%, 87%, and 81% of the cases, respectively. In contrast, Bs 
follow 6 only 46% of the times. This difference in following between 6 and all other numbers 
is statistically significant (p-value=0.028, in all cases). The regression analysis provided in 
Table 3 also confirms this finding. 
Figure 3 shows that the likelihood with which Bs follow messages 1 to 5 over time 
increases from between 75% and 89% of the time in period 1 to above 91% for all messages 
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by period 24. Following a message of 6 does not show any trend over time. This difference in 
the time trend is significant for messages 3, 4, and 5, compared to message 6, when other 
controls are included (see Table 3). Table 3 also reveals that Bs react to being hurt in the past 
(column (3)). Interestingly, Bs do not react to whether they were lied to in the previous period 
per se. They, however, significantly reduce following behavior if an A lied to them in period t-
1 and they followed. 
<Insert Figure 3> 
<Insert Table 3> 
To examine whether following behavior is in line with its expected payoffs, we calculate 
for each message r the probability that the message is true 𝑝!(𝑟). Table 4 displays this 
probability as well as the difference between B’s expected payoff of following 𝐸𝜋! 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 10 ∙ 𝑝! 𝑟   and the payoff from not following 𝜋! 𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 3. Except 
for message 6, this difference is significantly positive, that is, following results in a higher 
expected payoff than not following (Sign test, p-value=0.03). However, Bs do not earn a 
significantly different expected payoff when following and not following message 6 (Sign 
test, p-value=0.6). Thus, on average, Bs seem to correctly anticipate As’ incentives to lie and 
take them into account when deciding whether to follow a message. 
<Insert Table 4> 
 
3.3. Classification of As: Lying types 
In Table 5, we present a classification of the strategies submitted by As in each period. 
We classify individuals’ strategies within each period to one of eight types. We then average 
over all periods to obtain the numbers presented in Table 5. 
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First, we classify the strategy to be truthful about every state. As follow this strategy 33% 
of the time over all periods (Type 1). Second, we consider the strategy consistent with the 
standard assumption of self-interest, namely, reporting 6 independent of the state (Type 2). 
Over all periods, As follow this strategy 28% of the time.2 Third, we identify a class of four 
strategies for which the decision to lie depends on the consequences (Types 3 through 6). 
Particularly, these strategies map into messages that tell the truth about high states and 
exaggerate low states. In total, As follow this strategy 23% of the time over all periods. A 
strategy that maps into lies independent of the state is used 5% of the time (Type 7), whereas 
11% of the time As lie in some states and are truthful in others, without any particular pattern 
(Type 8).  
<Insert Table 4> 
Next we examine the behavior of each participant A over time and check for consistency 
in the strategy used. If we consider all periods 1 to 24, we find 14% of As (i.e., 5 out 36) 
choose to always tell the truth independent of state. These participants send a true message in 
all periods regardless of the cost. By making the monetary cost of telling the truth steeper, 
future research may investigate the sensitivity of this fraction to incentives.  
The same number of As (14%) choose to always exaggerate the state if it is not 6. Hence 
two types can be isolated from the data: those who never lie and those who lie whenever they 
have a monetary incentive to do so.  
The rest of the As try different message patterns, especially in the first periods. However, 
in the final quarter of the experiment (periods 19 to 24), the majority of As (53%) consistently 
follow the same type of strategy. In the final quarter of the experiment, 19% of As always tell 
the truth and 22% exaggerate in all states except 6. Further, 8% of all As consistently lie 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Note that this group may also include individuals who are averse to lying, but for whom the costs of lying are 
very low and cannot be captured within our range of payoffs. The opposite applies to Type 1 as well. 
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depending on the consequences, that is, behave either as Types 3, 4, 5, or 6 through the last 
periods. We also find a single participant A, who always lies.  
 
4. Conclusion 
When and why do people lie in economic interactions? The answer to these questions is 
important for understanding economic activities. In this paper, we offer a new approach to 
measuring such behavior via a simple information transmission game. In the game we design, 
the decision to lie is independent of beliefs regarding the reaction of the other participants. 
This design allows us to measure the sender’s decision to lie.  
As mentioned above, when a sender also cares about the payoffs of the receiver, her beliefs 
regarding his actions are important. If she believes that he will not follow her message, she 
might be more willing to lie than if she expects him to follow it. Follow up studies could 
measure these beliefs directly. 
The design also allows us to have data on individual behavior over time. Our results show 
an individual’s tendency to lie increases with the gains from lying. When comparing our data 
to previous studies we find very similar results. If the state is 1, 52% of senders lie by 
reporting 6 (overall periods, 33% in period 1), creating a benefit of 10 for the sender and a 
loss of 10 for a receiver who follows. Interestingly, Gneezy (2005) finds the same percentage 
of lying for the case (+10, -10). If the state is 5, only an average of 33% of senders lie by 
reporting a 6, which benefits the sender by 2 and costs the receiver who follows 10. Gneezy 
(2005) finds 17% of senders lie for the case (+1, -10). Our experiment additionally allows 
measuring the effect of experience. We find that when the gains are high, the frequency of 
lying increases with experience.  
Further, we can classify people according to the evolution of their decisions over time. We 
find some participants are always honest, and a bit fewer senders always maximize monetary 
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benefits (send the message 6). A third prominent group consists of people who react to 
incentives—lie when the incentives to do so are high but not when the incentives are low. 
Gaining experience over time reduces the strictly truthful behavior and increases both the 
strictly selfish behavior and the rate of lying when incentives to do so are high.  
Nonetheless, on an individual level, we observe a considerable aversion to lying, which 
strategic considerations cannot explain. Although this aversion decays slightly over time, it is 
still prominent in the final quarter of the experiment and occurs with the same magnitude as 
the strictly selfish behavior.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Determinants of A’s decision to send message 6 
  P(sending "the number drawn is 6") 
  (1) (2) 
s=1 -0.436*** -0.484*** 
 
[0.076] [0.0805] 
s=2 -0.477*** -0.532*** 
 
[0.071] [0.0718] 
s=3 -0.510*** -0.501*** 
 
[0.070] [0.0703] 
s=4 -0.570*** -0.565*** 
 
[0.076] [0.0724] 
s=5 -0.607*** -0.603*** 
 
[0.074] [0.0753] 
Period 0.003** -0.000676 
 
[0.002] [0.00165] 
Age -0.011* -0.0103** 
 
[0.006] [0.00451] 
Female 0.044 0.0484 
 
[0.120] [0.122] 
s=1*period 
 
0.00797*** 
  
[0.00284] 
s=2*period 
 
0.00818*** 
  
[0.00253] 
s=3*period . 0.00279 
  
[0.00194] 
s=4*period 
 
0.00252 
  
[0.00254] 
s=5*period 
 
0.00254 
  
[0.00264] 
Constant 
 
1.139*** 
   [0.153] 
N 5,184 5,184 
Nr. of subjects 36 36 
Method Probit OLS 
(Pseudo-)R2 0.131 0.163 
Loglikelihood -3121 -3302 
Note: Column (1) displays the estimated marginal effects from the probit 
regression. Column (2) displays the estimated coefficients from the OLS 
regression, due to the difficulties of interpreting interaction terms in the 
probit model (see Ai and Norton, 2003). Standard errors are presented in 
brackets and are corrected for clustering at subject level. 
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Table 2. Determinants of A’s decision to lie 
  Probability of lying 
  (1) (2) (3) 
State (s) -0.066*** -0.0840*** -0.0902*** 
 
[0.015] [0.0153] [0.0158] 
Period 0.002* 0.00686** 0.00318 
 
[0.001] [0.00253] [0.00222] 
Age -0.016** -0.0131*** -0.00873*** 
 
[0.007] [0.00401] [0.00272] 
Female 0.19 0.184 0.123 
 
[0.129] [0.115] [0.0743] 
State*Period 
 
-0.00136** -0.00099 
  
[0.000631] [0.000620] 
Lied in t-1 
  
0.400*** 
   
[0.0526] 
Lied in t-1 & B followed 
  
-0.0627* 
   
[0.0337] 
Constant 
 
0.931*** 0.753*** 
  
[0.182] [0.140] 
N 5,184 5,184 4,968 
Nr. of subjects 36 36 36 
Method Probit OLS OLS 
(Pseudo-)R2 0.135 0.172 0.306 
Loglikelihood -3095 -3259 -2687 
Note: Column (1) displays the estimated marginal effects from the probit regression. 
Column (2) displays the estimated coefficients from the OLS regression, due to the 
difficulties of interpreting interaction terms in the probit model (see Ai and Norton, 
2003). Standard errors are presented in brackets and are corrected for clustering at 
subject level. Results remain qualitatively the same if the cases where the state is 6 
(and lying is rarely observed) are not considered. 
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Table 3. Determinants of B’s decision to follow 
  P(following) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Message received = 1 0.290*** 0.319*** 0.312*** 
	  
[0.044] [0.0800] [0.0823] 
Message received = 2 0.318*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 
 
[0.044] [0.0823] [0.0845] 
Message received = 3 0.340*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 
 
[0.037] [0.0818] [0.0846] 
Message received = 4 0.305*** 0.319*** 0.312*** 
 
[0.036] [0.0768] [0.0792] 
Message received = 5 0.245*** 0.238*** 0.243*** 
 
[0.034] [0.0661] [0.0708] 
Period 0.004* -0.00278 -0.00201 
 
[0.002] [0.00410] [0.00389] 
Age 0.001 0.000516 0.000344 
 
[0.004] [0.00326] [0.00264] 
Female 0.034 0.0323 0.0411 
 
[0.080] [0.0824] [0.0751] 
Period*Message=1 
 
0.00622 0.00664 
	    
[0.00462] [0.00452] 
Period*Message=2 
 
0.00763 0.00763 
  
[0.00471] [0.00466] 
Period*Message=3 . 0.00894* 0.00892* 
  
[0.00477] [0.00488] 
Period*Message=4 
 
0.00729* 0.00771* 
  
[0.00391] [0.00410] 
Period*Message=5 
 
0.00913** 0.00884** 
  
[0.00399] [0.00415] 
Followed in t-1 
	   	  
0.216*** 
 	   	  
[0.0499] 
Received lie in t-1 
	   	  
0.0281 
 	   	  
[0.0320] 
Followed & received lie in t-1 
	   	  
-0.116*** 
 	   	  
[0.0408] 
Constant 
 
0.455*** 0.316*** 
    [0.118] [0.110] 
N 5,184 5,184 4,968 
Nr. of subjects 36 36 36 
Method Probit OLS OLS 
(Pseudo-)R2 0.126 0.15 0.198 
Loglikelihood -2316 -2259 -2021 
 
Note: Column (1) displays the estimated marginal effects from the probit regression. Column 
(2) displays the estimated coefficients from the OLS regression, due to the difficulties of 
interpreting interaction terms in the probit model (see Ai and Norton, 2003). Standard errors 
are presented in brackets and are corrected for clustering at subject level.	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Table 4. B’s expected excess payoff from following 
Message r 𝑝!(𝑟) 𝐸𝜋! 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝜋!(𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤) N 
r=1 0.80 4.95 6 
r=2 0.82 5.21 6 
r=3 0.79 4.86 6 
r=4 0.82 5.22 6 
r=5 0.79 4.87 6 
r=6 0.31 0.15 6 
 
Table 5. Classification of As’ strategies 
  Strategy of Participant A 
Over all 
periods 
First 6 periods 
(1-6) 
Last 6 periods 
(19-24) 
(1) Always truthful 33% 37% 31% 
(2) Always report 6a 28% 26% 31% 
(3) Exaggerate 1; truthful about 2,3,4,5,6 b 1% 2% 0% 
(4) Exaggerate 1, 2; truthful about 3, 4, 5, 6b 6% 1% 9% 
(5) Exaggerate 1, 2, 3; truthful about 4, 5, 6b 10% 10% 8% 
(6) Exaggerate 1, 2, 3, 4; truthful about 5, 6b 6% 6% 6% 
(7) Always lie 5% 4% 6% 
(8) Other 11% 14% 7% 
Note: a  The percentages remain similar if we also include As who exaggerate all states except 6 but 
do not necessarily send 6 in each state (change by less than 1%). b The percentages remain similar if 
we also include As who underreport when lying (change by less than 1%). 
	  
	  
Figure 1: Messages sent by A 
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Figure 2: Truthfulness and lying of A over time 
 
 
Figure 3: Following behavior by B 
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Appendix: Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
Please read these instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, 
depending on the decisions you and the other participants make in this experiment. 
 
Participants, Periods and Pairs 
• During the entire experiment you play in a group of 12, consisting of 6 participants A 
and 6 participants B. Neither participant knows the identity of the other participants.  
 
• At the beginning of the experiment you are informed whether you are participant A or 
participant B. This will not change in the course of the experiment. 
 
• The experiment consists of 24 periods. 
 
• In every period the computer randomly allocates the participants of your group to six 
pairs, each consisting of one participant A and one participant B. In the course of the 
experiment every participant A will be matched to every participant B in exactly four 
periods (and vice versa).  
 
• The computer will randomly assign the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 to these six pairs. No 
number is assigned more than once. Participant A is informed about the number assigned 
to the pair and sends a message about that number to participant B. Participant B, who is 
not informed about the number assigned to the pair, has to decide whether he/she will 
follow the message of participant A. Detailed descriptions of the course of the 
experiment and the resulting payments will follow. 
 
Decisions 
• For every possible number assigned to the pair participant A has to formulate a 
message to participant B about the assigned number. The message does not have to 
contain the actual assigned number:  
 
If the assigned number is  1 2 3 4 5 6 
then the message to participant B is: 
The assigned number is 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
• Before participant B receives the message of participant A , participant B has to decide 
for all possible messages whether or not he/she will follow the message:  
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• Corresponding to the number assigned to the pair, the message of participant A is sent to 
participant B and the corresponding decision of participant B is carried out. 
 
Payments 
• Participant A receives 10 points plus the doubled amount of the number sent in the 
message in points. That is 12 points if participant A sent the message that the assigned 
number is 1; 14 points if participant A sent the message is that the assigned number is 2; 
and so on.  
• If participant B follows the message of participant A, participant B receives 10 points in 
case the message contains the actual number assigned to the pair. Otherwise, participant 
B receives 0 points. 
• If participant B does not follow the message of participant A, participant B receives 3 
points. 
 
Information 
• At the end of every period you will be informed about the results of your pair: the 
assigned number, the message of participant A to participant B, the decision whether 
participant B followed the message of participant A, the payment of participant A and 
the payment of participant B. 
• Moreover, you obtain a table containing the same information of all your plays from the 
previous periods.  
 
Payment in Euro 
At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 Euro per 25 points. This payment and the 
additional 4 Euros for showing up in time are paid immediately after the experiment ends. 
 
	  
If participant A sends the message  Then your decision is 
“The assigned number is 1”     to follow     ⃝        ⃝  not to follow 
“The assigned number is 2”     to follow     ⃝        ⃝  not to follow 
“The assigned number is 3”     to follow     ⃝        ⃝  not to follow 
“The assigned number is 4”     to follow     ⃝        ⃝  not to follow 
“The assigned number is 5”     to follow     ⃝        ⃝  not to follow 
“The assigned number is 6”     to follow     ⃝        ⃝  not to follow 
